I hope Zimbabwe opposition parties are not counting too much on South Africa, the undeclared regional big brother, to step-in and impartially resolve any election mess that may arise in 2018.
In this post I develop the logic that the South Africa of today is cumulatively becoming different politically from the South Africa of 2008. This presents far-reaching implications on opposition political parties in Zimbabwe as the 2018 high stakes elections slowly but surely come into view.
Since the 2008 election dispute that moved the hand of the regional body, Southern African Development Community (SADC), to broker the Global Political Agreement (GPA) in Zimbabwe which brought about what became commonly known as the Government of National Unity (GNU), major events that I think have serious repercussions on the opposition are currently taking place in South Africa.
While opposition in Zimbabwe may have scored some wins with support from South Africa during the 2008 political crisis, am increasingly doubtful there will be a repeat of that kind of support in any future disputed general election in Zimbabwe. The issue is not with the opposition in Zimbabwe but with South Africa itself.
I think it’s just a matter of time before this becomes more apparent.
Events in South Africa playing out through the African National Congress (ANC) which is the governing party there, point to drastically reduced future fortunes for Zimbabwe’s opposition should things turn untidy politically in 2018.
I recommend that opposition parties in Zimbabwe should not strategically anchor hope in SADC or South Africa in particular to plead their cause should things blow-up.
There is a further dimension to this. If South Africa being the SADC big brother by population, military prowess and GDP elects to do nothing meaningful about any messy situation in Zimbabwe, that would essentially mark the end of any hope of meaningful regional help for an under siege Zimbabwe opposition.
South Africa not only facilitated the 2008 political negotiations in Zimbabwe, it became a guarantor of the subsequent Agreement.While South Africa’s involvement in Zimbabwe was at the behest of SADC, there are more reasons why South Africa would naturally play that role.
South Africa and SACU
Nearly half of all SADC members are under the sway of South Africa by virtue of their membership in South Africa dominated Southern Africa Customs Union (SACU). These are Botswana, Lesotho, Nambia and Swaziland the so called BLNS countries.
Each of the BLNS countries has very strong industrial and commercial links with South Africa. SACU is extremely important to BLNS so much that up to 50% of Swaziland’s public budget relies on SACU revenue receipts. South Africa’s mastery over Lesotho is clear as demonstrated by the crushing of previous coup related disturbances in Lesotho, general reliance of SADC on South Africa to solve those issues, and also because of South Africa’s own interests in the Lesotho Highlands Water Project (LHWP) which makes it ever ready to get involved in Lesotho even militarily.
While Botswana has been previously vocal concerning the situation In Zimbabwe back then, President Ian Khama has tended to tone down his rhetoric against Harare. In any case, nothing drastic that Botswana could choose to do towards Zimbabwe is likely to have any real impact.
As for Namibia, the comradeship between Harare and Windhoek is genuine. A disputed election is unlikely to bring this friendship undone. Besides, historically Nambia has largely been mute when others spoke out publicly against Harare. In fact the two countries run a much celebrated though commercially problematic 12 year old joint media project in the form of a print newspaper known as The Southern Times((The Herald – Namibia hails Southern Times regional impact)) targeting the region with a pan-African message.
The remaining SADC members apart from Mozambique which generally views Zimbabwe as an authoritative big brother due to Zimbabwe’s supportive role in that country’s internal strive (and possible cries for help to soon follow to do with current RENAMO pressures) are either weak or generally far removed from the scene, geographically, so much so any drastic reactions to ZANU PF excesses are unlikely to yield any sufficient effect to cause meaningful restraint on Harare.
The increasingly unwilling elephant in the room
So the real elephant in the room for Zimbabwe remains South Africa.
If South Africa is perceived as the real game changer for the opposition in the event of a disputed election, then the developments that have taken place there in recent years must be serious red flags to any opposition strategy that gives undue weight on South Africa’s role to effectively resolve any unfavorable situation in Zimbabwe.
As things stand, the ANC has increasingly been reading from ZANU PF’s strategy book. In fact, ZANU PF has had untold but immense influence not only on South Africa but on the region as a whole. This is since its July 2013 election win which the region accepted even though disputed by the opposition. This influence deserves a brief examination.
Senior in the continent
By President Zuma’s own admission President Mugabe is a “senior in the continent”((President Jacob Zuma speaking at Fort Hare Centenary Celebrations, May 2016, Fort Hare University, South Africa)).
It is also the ZANU PF government in Zimbabwe under President Mugabe’s Chairmanship at SADC that Zimbabwe galvanized SADC to think value addition and beneficiation regarding the regions’ natural resources before export.((The Herald – 34th SADC Summit Communique, Victoria Falls, Zimbabwe, 2014))
This philosophy originates from ZANU PF’s own 2013 election manifesto which now guides government programmes until 2018 in Zimbabwe by the name ZimAsset. During his one year tenure as SADC chair, President Mugabe did successfully exert certain thinking and general philosophy of ZANU PF on his regional peers. This in social sciences is interpreted in terms of social constructivism.
The EFF factor
In searching for the real trigger in South African politics that could have stimulated a new ANC complexion that increasingly mimics ZANU PF, there is a compelling pull towards Malema’s Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) party launched in 2013 and that subsequently won nearly 1.2 million votes (6.35%) in the 2014 general election.
There is reason to believe that EFF’s performance in terms of scale in that election seriously worried the ANC. This is considering that the EFF is a product of an ANC internal fall-out. The EFF declares itself as going after the ANC, sparsely attacking any other opposition party in South Africa.
It is this pressure build-up retched up by the EFF on an ANC that was already weak in delivering on the promise of better social services to the most marginalized members of the population that I contend has tempted the party to increasingly peruse the tried and tested ZANU PF cookbook.
Regime change agenda
The well known guiding ZANU PF ideology is rooted in a stinging anti west rhetoric. I therefore worry for Zimbabwe’s opposition that in recent months the ANC has increasingly learned this same language, openly accusing the the United States of a regime change agenda, for example. ((The Guardian – ANC accuses US diplomats of pursuing regime change agenda))
The trouble with this mantra is that it is so toxic and ultimately paints just about everything black and white – literally.
It is therefore not surprising that the recent terror attack warnings issued by the west led by the US concerning possible attacks at South African malls were received with deep suspicion even at government level.((USnews.com – South Africa refutes US terror threat warning))
This is what a regime change frame of mind increasingly produces. It has the capacity to taint just about any area of government thought process. The ANC led government in South Africa is well on its way in warming up to this way of thinking towards its own entities. In Zimbabwe, opposition parties know very well they are permanently labelled regime change agents by their own government. It would be foolhardy for Zimbabwe’s opposition parties to believe a foreign government holding this same regime change worldview would be a trustworthy mediator.
This is really why I think Zimbabwe’s opposition parties should have out of their minds any hope and expectation of meaningful and unbiased South African intervention unless something drastic takes place here or in South Africa in favor of the opposition before the high stakes 2018 election.
There is overwhelming evidence to show that the ANC government is taking the regime change agenda seriously. A recent article in the Daily Maverick((Daily Maverik – Why should civil society organisations incite regime change in a transparent democracy?)) narrated how the upcoming Nonprofit Organisations (NPO) bill in South Africa is driven by an increasingly inherent government paranoia towards foreign entities. The bill itself follows an attempt around 2013-2014 by the South African government to close non-profit organisations, the online publication further reports.
This is reminiscent of the infamous NGO bill in Zimbabwe of around 2004 which somehow civil society managed to rebuff. Despite its failure, President Mugabe has not shied away from attacking NGOs as regime change agents even at high level fora such as the African Union (AU) repeatedly reminding fellow leaders to watch out for NGOs.
Look alike activities
I see more activities taking place under the ANC government that are making it increasingly difficult to distinguish it from ZANU PF’s own modus operandi.
Recently, the already controversial South African Broadcasting Cooperation (SABC) went ahead to internally ban coverage of service provision related protests many of which have turned violent ahead of the August 2016 local government elections in South Africa. This is akin to what opposition parties in Zimbabwe with little relief have had to deal with concerning the ill-famed government controlled Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation (ZBC) since 2000.
The list is long of how the ANC government has seemingly followed step-in-step how the government of Zimbabwe has exercised statecraft and interacted with the opposition in the last 15 years in and out of elections. This includes accusations of state capture and attempts at judiciary capture something few in Zimbabwe dispute has taken place concerning state institutions.
All these factors put together should make it clear to Zimbabwe’s opposition particularly the Movement for Democratic Change led by Morgan Tsvangirai (MDC-T) which previously enjoyed some support from South Africa in particular and SADC in general that South Africa and by extension SADC, while still relevant, should not be the primary back-up strategy in the event of a serpentine 2018 election.
I hope Zimbabwe’s opposition is convinced the honeymoon decisively ended in 2013.
Whatever South Africa may choose to do to help a situation gone wrong against the opposition in Zimbabwe in 2018 lacks a solid basis to believe it will be impartial and in the best interest of the opposition for the reasons explained. The ANC itself will be facing a tough national election of its own a year later in 2019 against opponents it is increasingly accusing of being influenced by regime change agents.